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abstract
Whether it seems that you know something depends in part upon practical factors.
When the stakes are low, it can seem to you that you know that p, but when the
stakes go up it’ll seem to you that you don’t. The apparent sensitivity of knowledge
to stakes presents a serious challenge to epistemologists who endorse a stable
semantics for knowledge attributions and reject the idea that whether you know
something depends on how much is at stake. After arguing that previous attempts
to meet this challenge fall short, I offer a new solution: the unassertability account.
The account starts with the observation that high stakes subjects aren’t in an epi-
stemic position to assert. We generally presuppose that knowing is sufcient for
epistemically proper assertion, but this presupposition only stands up to scrutiny
if we draw a distinction between two notions of epistemic propriety, and we
shouldn’t expect ordinary speakers to draw it. A subject in a high stakes situation
who fails to draw the distinction will be led by the sufciency claim to treat any-
thing she isn’t in a position to assert as something she isn’t in a position to know.
The sensitivity of epistemically proper assertion to practical factors explains the
merely apparent sensitivity of knowledge to stakes.
1. introduction
Invariantists think that the truth conditions of knowledge claims are stable across contexts
of utterance and assessment, at least so far as the contribution of the word ‘knows’ and its
cognates go. Purists think that what’s epistemically required to know something is xed
across practical situations. Purist invariantism has something like received view status
in epistemology, so I’ll call it traditionalism: denying invariantism requires endorsing an
innovative contextualist or relativist account of the semantics of knowledge claims,
while impurism involves a signicant departure from the intuitively plausible idea that
knowing that p isn’t made easier by being in a situation where it doesn’t matter very
much whether p is true.1
1 Opponents of invariantism include contextualists such as Cohen (1988), Lewis (1996), and DeRose
(2009), as well as relativists like MacFarlane (2005) (see MacFarlane 2009 and Stainton 2010 for some-
what different versions of contextualism). Opponents of purism include Hawthorne (2004), Stanley
(2005), and Fantl and McGrath (2009) (who introduced the term ‘purism’ to name the view they
oppose and point out on page 28 that to many purism ‘seems clearly true’). Versions of impurism
are also proposed more cautiously by Grimm (2011) and (even more cautiously) Schroeder (2012).
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Our ordinary thought and talk about knowledge suggest that either purism or invar-
iantism has to go. For many ps, when the practical stakes related to the truth of p are
low, it seems to us that we know that p, but when the stakes go up, it seems to us that
we don’t.2 Variantists say that a change in stakes can affect what’s required for a knowl-
edge claim to be true. Impurists say that a change in stakes can affect what is epistemically
required of a subject to know. Either path suggests a natural explanation for the sensitivity
of the appearance of knowledge to stakes. But both are closed to the traditionalist.
Most traditionalists concede that in some range of situations it seems to us that we
know things that we don’t, in fact, know, or else that it seems to us that we don’t
know things that we do, in fact, know. Skeptical traditionalists say that the low-stakes
appearance of knowledge is inaccurate.Moderate traditionalists say instead that the high-
stakes appearance of ignorance is misleading.3 The orientation of this paper is moderate
traditionalism. So why, when the practical stakes are high, does it appear that we are
ignorant of propositions that we are, in fact, in a position to know? This is the problem
of the misleading appearance of ignorance.
After criticizing previous attempts to solve the problem on behalf of the moderate trad-
itionalist, I will propose an alternative: the unassertability solution. The unassertability
solution starts with an idea that has been used as a key premise in powerful arguments
against moderate traditionalism: the principle that knowing is sufcient for epistemically
proper assertion.4 But that principle only withstands scrutiny if we draw a distinction
between a broad and a narrow notion of epistemically proper action. The distinction
between broad and narrow propriety turns out to undermine the anti-traditionalist argu-
ments. It also opens up an explanation for the high-stakes appearance of ignorance. The
unassertability solution says that we tend to blur the distinction between broad and nar-
row propriety, with the result that in high stakes situations an accurate assessment that a
speaker is not in a position to assert a proposition generates the misleading appearance
that she is not in a position to know it.
I follow the common practice of characterizing purism and invariantism in terms of a subject’s epi-
stemic position. Purism says that whether a subject’s epistemic position is sufcient for knowing that p
does not vary directly with her practical situation; invariantism implies that whether a subject’s epistem-
ic position is sufcient for it to be true to attribute to her ‘knowledge’ that p does not shift with the
context in which the attribution is made or assessed. A subject’s epistemic position is understood to
be a function of ‘exclusively truth-relevant dimensions like how strong [her] evidence for/against p is,
how reliable are the belief-forming processes available to [her] which would produce a belief that p,
how strong [her] counterfactual relations to the truth-value of p (how sensitive, how safe your available
basis is for believing that p), etc.’ (Fantl and McGrath 2009: 27).
2 There is controversy over what factors are most directly relevant to the uctuation: is it a shift in prac-
tical stakes, salient error possibilities, contextually relevant questions, or something else? See Schaffer
(2005) for discussion. Recent ‘experimental’ philosophy purports to cast doubt on the claim that knowl-
edge attributions are as shifty as is typically assumed by participants in the debate. Knobe and Schaffer
(2012) provide a good overview; for critical responses see DeRose (2011) and Brown (2013). To the
extent that this work casts doubt on the shiftiness of our knowledge attributions and denials, it under-
cuts the case against traditionalism. This paper presupposes that the appearance of knowledge is sensi-
tive to practical situations; the question is how the traditionalist should account for this fact.
3 I use the term ‘ignorance’ in a somewhat stipulative sense to mean what could more awkwardly but
accurately be called ‘non-knowledge’; this usage has been common in epistemology since at least
Unger (1975). For a persuasive case that ignorance, properly speaking, is not (merely) non-knowledge,
see Peels (2010).
4 See, for example, DeRose (2009: ch. 3), Hawthorne (2004), and Schaffer (2008).
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2. bob and carol and ted and alice
Cases of the relevant sort are quite familiar. Here is a pair of cases of the familiar kind:
The set-up. Bob and Carol have been invited to a dinner party at Ted and Alice’s tonight; only Bob
can go, since Carol has to work the night shift. They decide to make cupcakes. Bob will take most
to the dinner party, and Carol will take the rest to work. The only spice their recipe calls for is
cardamom. They follow the recipe, and bake several dozen, but decide to experiment with the
last bit of batter by adding some cinnamon. After baking the rest, they carefully set the cinnamon
cupcakes aside to try later.
At the ofce. Carol announces to her coworkers that she’s brought cupcakes. ‘Ooh,’ exclaims her
friend, ‘I love cupcakes!’ But just before taking a bite, she pauses to ask, ‘These smell spicy – do
they have cinnamon?’
‘No, they only have cardamom,’ Carol answers.
‘Okay, because I really don’t like cinnamon.’
‘Bob and I baked them ourselves this morning,’ Alice says, ‘so I know that they don’t have cinna-
mon in them.’
At the dinner party. Bob hands Alice his box of cupcakes. ‘Freshly baked!’ he declares. ‘Ooh,’
exclaims Alice, ‘we always love your desserts!’ But then she frowns. ‘I haven’t told you yet, but
last week Ted had to go to the emergency room – it turns out that he’s developed a rare severe
cinnamon allergy! The doctors say that it can be fatal; he’s lucky to have survived the attack.
So now we have to be extremely careful about what he eats. These don’t have cinnamon in
them, do they?’
‘Well,’ Bob says, ‘I’m quite sure they don’t: the only spice the recipe calls for is cardamom. But we
did add cinnamon to some of the batter at the end, just as an experiment. We set those last few
cupcakes aside, and I’m condent none of them got mixed in with the rest. But you know, I sup-
pose it is possible that they did. I suppose it’s even possible that we accidentally put some cinna-
mon in the rest, though I seriously doubt it. Still, I guess there’s a slight chance the cupcakes could
have cinnamon in them. So I don’t know that they don’t.’
‘Do you think Carol would know?’
‘No, we were together the whole time. She doesn’t know either.’
At the ofce, Carol asserts (1); at Alice’s, Bob asserts (2) and (3):
(1) I know that the cupcakes don’t have cinnamon in them.
(2) I don’t know that the cupcakes don’t have cinnamon in them.
(3) Carol doesn’t know that the cupcakes don’t have cinnamon in them.
Considered with respect to the conversation where it’s uttered, each assertion is natural
and seemingly true. A moderate will say that given Carol’s epistemic position, (1) is
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true. Invariantism implies that (1) and (3) are contradictory, so if (1) is true, (3) is false.5
Moreover, Carol and Bob have the same basis for believing that the cupcakes don’t con-
tain cinnamon, and Bob has no evidence against this proposition that Carol lacks. If their
epistemic positions with respect to the cinnamon proposition are identical, purism implies
that Carol is in a position to know it only if Bob is. Hence given purism, (1) makes (2)
highly doubtful. But if (1) is true and (2) and (3) are false, why do (2) and (3) seem
true when considered with respect to Bob’s conversation?
Previous attempts to answer this question on behalf of moderate traditionalism fall into
three families. Pragmatic solutions rely on the idea that assertions typically convey infor-
mation beyond the contents asserted to explain our false knowledge denials.6 If false
knowledge denials convey relevant information in high stakes contexts, they may be
appropriate even though false. One challenge for this strategy is that high stakes knowl-
edge denials seem true, and not merely appropriate. There is no general tendency to mis-
take conversational propriety for truth: assertions that are hyperbolic, meiotic,
metaphorical, ironic, and sarcastic can all be appropriate while clearly appearing, upon
even momentary reection, to be false. In these cases, attention to the distinction between
the literal content of the speaker’s assertion and what she communicates by making the
assertion makes it easy to see that the former is false. Moreover, unlike standard examples
of appropriate but false assertion, high stakes knowledge denials seem true even in
thought. From the perspective of a high stakes situation, subjects seem not to know. It
is not clear how the communicative effects of an assertion should affect how its content
appears in silent contemplation.7
Timothy Williamson instead offers an illusion solution. He says that when we focus on
unusual possibilities of error, we tend to give them more weight in our judgments about
knowledge than is warranted, thereby experiencing ‘an illusion of epistemic danger’
(Williamson 2005: 225–6).8 But this doesn’t seem like a plausible diagnosis of Bob’s
case. Illusory appearances are resilient even for subjects who recognize them to be mislead-
ing. Bob’s attitude towards the risk that the cupcakes contain cinnamon doesn’t rest on such
an appearance. With additional conrmation that the unlikely cinnamon scenarios he men-
tions didn’t occur, the epistemic appearances would change. For example, he would treat a
5 For the purposes of this paper I’m treating some views that accept that ‘knows’ is semantically stable as
versions of variantism; for example the view that circumstances of evaluation contain a parameter that
varies with epistemic standards (MacFarlane 2005, 2009; Brogaard 2008) or that different contents can
be asserted by distinct utterances of a semantically invariant knowledge-attributing sentence (Stainton
2010).
6 See, for example Rysiew (2001, 2007), Black (2005), Brown (2006) and Hazlett (2007). For criticism,
see DeRose (2009: 118–24), Fantl and McGrath (2009: 28–42), Iacono (2008), and MacFarlane (2005:
207–8).
7 Rysiew (2007) suggests that speakers and listeners typically blur the boundaries between the informa-
tion semantically encoded by a knowledge claim and that (merely) pragmatically conveyed by its utter-
ance. Rysiew’s suggestion could help a proponent of the pragmatic solution explain why high stakes
knowledge denials seem true even in thought.
8 More specically, he proposes that the illusion of epistemic danger is an effect of the availability heur-
istic, which leads subjects to overestimate the likelihood of situations that can be easily imagined or are
especially salient.. Nagel (2010) persuasively criticizes Williamson’s appeal to the availability heuristic
on empirical grounds. But the core of the illusion proposal doesn’t involve the availability heuristic.
The suggestion is simply that when attending to possibilities of error we generally ignore, we tend to
experience an illusion of epistemic danger.
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lab test indicating that the cupcakes didn’t contain cinnamon as conclusive, and so regard
himself as knowing. More generally, his assessment of his epistemic situation indicates high
cognitive function and epistemic responsibility, unlike a faulty judgment based on an illu-
sory appearance. He methodically reviews his evidence and responds to Carol with a degree
of caution that seems entirely appropriate given the high stakes involved.
In addition, Williamson’s proposal implies that the speaker overestimates the likelihood
that the subject has made an error. But this description is also inapt in Bob’s case. He
acknowledges the chance that he’s wrong to be quite small. The high stakes lead him to
take his epistemic risks seriously, but taking small risks seriously is not the same as treating
them as larger than they really are. Rather, his mistake, from the perspective of the moderate
traditionalist, is to judge that the tiny chance of error is incompatible with knowing.
Lost attitude solutions say that when the stakes go up, subjects tend to lose the doxastic
attitude required for knowledge. Jennifer Nagel has worked out a version of this solution in
brilliant detail. Nagel says that subjects in high stakes situations experience a high ‘need for
closure’; i.e., they require more information before forming settled beliefs than do subjects in
low stakes situations (Nagel 2008). She calls the force underlying this phenomenon ‘epi-
stemic anxiety’ (Nagel 2011). Perhaps, experiencing heightened epistemic anxiety about
the cinnamon, Bob refrains from forming a settled belief in the proposition that the cup-
cakes are cinnamon-free. If he lacks a settled belief, he doesn’t know, and so (2) is true.9
One objection to Nagel’s proposal is that Bob seems capable of regarding himself as
having a settled belief while still thinking that he doesn’t know. He could naturally say
that while he believes that there’s no cinnamon, he doesn’t know.10 Moreover, the lost
attitude account doesn’t explain why it seems to Bob that Carol doesn’t know. Nagel pro-
poses accounting for the third-person appearance of ignorance in terms of a bias called
‘epistemic egoism’ that leads us to regard others as if they had more in common with
us than they do when attributing mental states to them (Nagel 2010). Bob and those of
us sympathetically imagining his conversation may treat Carol as if she ‘shared our heigh-
tened need for evidence’ (Nagel 2011: 425). This egoistic projection could result in a mis-
taken impression that (3) is true; Carol would appear to have adopted the attitude of
knowing without having acquired the additional evidence demanded by her (projected)
9 Nagel’s diagnosis echoes Kent Bach’s suggestion that in high stakes situations our ‘threshold for (con-
dently) believing’ goes up, meaning that we require especially strong evidence for a proposition before
we are willing to condently believe it (Bach 2005).
10 This objection to the lost attitude proposal may not be very powerful. For one thing, concessive belief
reports such as these do not obviously constitute claims about the speaker’s settled or condent beliefs,
especially in circumstances in which the subject also articulates grounds for doubt. They may instead
constitute hedged expressions of relative condence. Suppose that I recall that Sasha signed up for my
class, though I am quite unsure about whether she’s still in the class – a number of students dropped
out after the rst week, and she may have been one of them. I have no settled belief about whether
she’s in the class. But in answer to a question about whether she is in the class I could naturally
and appropriately reply, ‘I believe that she is, though I am not sure.’ Moreover, though epistemologists
typically use the word ‘belief’ and its cognates to denote the doxastic attitude required for knowledge,
there is room to doubt that the attitude we ordinarily denote with ‘belief’ is the attitude required for
knowledge. If the required attitude is stronger (e.g., if it is being sure (Ayer 1956: 34)), then Bob’s
report, even if it did constitute a claim about his beliefs, may not imply that he has the attitude required
for knowledge. Taking this suggestion on board, a slight modication to the lost attitude account – to
say that subjects in high stakes situations refrain from adopting the attitude of knowledge – would rec-
oncile it with the propriety of high stakes claims to believe but not to know.
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heightened epistemic anxiety.11 Though ingenious, the proposal is tendentious. I nd no
impression that Carol is in a state of heightened epistemic anxiety. Nor do I feel any inclin-
ation to treat her attitude as epistemically irresponsible: given her epistemic position and
practical situation, she seems to have just the doxastic attitudes she ought to have. Of
course if Nagel is right that our judgments are distorted by a cognitive bias we should
be alert to the possibility that our introspective assessment of the basis for those judgments
is inaccurate. Still, it is desirable to have an explanation for (3)’s apparent truth that does
not rest on the claim that we treat Carol as being either in a state of heightened epistemic
anxiety or epistemically irresponsible.
Moreover even granting Nagel’s egoistic projection explanation for the apparent truth of
(3), the problem of false denials persists. Bob also seems not to be in a position to know. From
the perspective of his conversation, it seems that even if he did have the attitude required for
knowledge, he still wouldn’t know. Indeed, in his conversationwith Alice an assertion of (2a),
though a bit clunkier, would be just as apparently true as his assertion of (2):
(2a) I’m not in a position to know that the cupcakes don’t have cinnamon in them.
If Bob lacks the attitude of knowledge, perhaps this is because it appears to him that his
epistemic position doesn’t warrant it. The moderate traditionalist must treat this appear-
ance as misleading. And in response to Alice’s last question Bob could assert:
(3a) Carol isn’t in a position to know that the cupcakes don’t have cinnamon in them.
Given that (1) is true, (3a) is false. Thus we have another false appearance to account for:
that, from the perspective of the high stakes conversation, neither Bob nor Carol is in a
position to know.
3. six desiderata for a solution
The challenges faced by the three solutions just discussed reect six aspects of the high stakes
appearanceof ignorance that anadequatemoderate traditionalist solution shouldaccount for:
Semantics. The high stakes appearance of ignorance is not diminished by careful attention to the
distinction between the content asserted by a knowledge denial and the other communicative
effects of asserting that content.
11 It is easy to suppose that Carol has the attitude of knowledge without diminishing the impression that
(3) is true. Bob could felicitously report that Carol, though sure, doesn’t know; or that while she may
think she knows, she doesn’t. So the error is not plausibly diagnosed in terms of an egoistic projection
of the speaker’s own reluctance to adopt the attitude of knowledge. Nagel’s proposal is that Bob pro-
jects his heightened epistemic anxiety onto Carol but not his caution about adopting the attitude of
knowledge. If he takes her to have adopted the attitude of knowledge without engaging in the further
effort demanded by her (projected) heightened need for evidence, then he’ll judge her to have done so
hastily and hence to have violated ‘an invariant standard censuring hasty or distracted thought’ (Nagel
2010: 304). The proposal yields a tidy explanation of the apparent truth of (3) that not only does not
require supposing that Bob treats Carol as lacking the attitude of knowledge, but requires supposing
that he treats her as having it.
geoff pynn
130 episteme volume 11–2
Thought. The high stakes appearance of ignorance arises in thought; it seems that the subject
doesn’t know, not merely that she can’t truly assert that she knows or that she can truly assert
that she doesn’t know.
Responsibility. The high stakes appearance of ignorance reects epistemically responsible caution
about the subject’s epistemic position.
Accuracy. The high stakes appearance of ignorance reects an accurate assessment of the subject’s
epistemic risks.
Projection. From the perspective of a high stakes situation, it seems that third parties in similar
epistemic positions don’t know either, even if they aren’t taken to be in high stakes situations.
Position to Know. The high stakes appearance of ignorance is accompanied by the appearance
that the subject is not in a position to know.
A fully satisfactory solution to the problem of false denials should explain each of these
aspects. The pragmatic solution struggles with Persistence and Thought; the illusion solu-
tion leaves Responsibility unexplained and – on Williamson’s formulation, at least – is
incompatible with Accuracy; the lost attitude solution predicts neither Projection nor
Position to Know. In what follows, I’ll lay out a solution that predicts and explains all
six aspects of the high stakes appearance of ignorance. But rst, a detour through a power-
ful argument against moderate traditionalism.
4. unassertability and ignorance
The apparent truth of (2) and (3) can be bolstered by an argument.12 It is plausible
that a speaker who knows that p is in an epistemic position sufcient for making
an epistemically proper assertion that p. The sufciency principle can be defended
by appeal to the proposal that the constitutive norm of assertion is that one should
assert only what one knows; if there are no other rules specic to assertion, anyone
who knows that p is in an epistemic position to assert that p.13 It can also be defended
by appeal to any proposal about the constitutive norm of assertion that species a con-
dition satised by anyone who knows.14 If the constitutive rule of assertion is that one
must satisfy C in order to assert that p, and C is a condition satised by anyone who
knows that p, then anyone who knows that p is in a position to assert that p. Finally,
it can be defended by appeal to our conversational practices. We recommend speakers
as sources of assertions on the basis of our presumption that they are in a position to
know and criticize speakers whose assertions would have been useful when we nd out
12 This argument resembles that given by DeRose (2002; for an updated discussion, see DeRose 2009:
ch. 3).
13 See Williamson (2000: ch. 11) for this proposal.
14 For example, the Truth Rule (Weiner 2005), the Justied Belief Rule (Kvanvig 2009), the Belief Rule
(Bach 2008), and the Rational Credibility Rule (Douven 2006) would all, given very plausible assump-
tions and treated as the sole norm governing assertion, imply that a speaker who knows is in a position
to assert.
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that they were in a position to know. Both practices suggest that we tacitly accept the
sufciency principle.15
Yet in his conversation with Alice, Bob would clearly do something epistemically
improper by asserting that the cupcakes are cinnamon-free. Having acknowledged the
slight but real chance that he’s mistaken, and fully cognizant of the stakes involved, he
could not then properly assert to Alice that the cupcakes have no cinnamon in them. If
being in a position to know sufces for being in a position to assert, then we can infer
ignorance from unassertability:
(U1) In his conversation with Alice, Bob is not in an epistemic position to assert that the
cupcakes are cinnamon-free.
(U2) If a speaker is in a position to know that p, then he or she is in an epistemic position
to assert that p.
(U3) So, in his conversation with Alice, Bob isn’t in a position to know that the cupcakes
are cinnamon-free.
Since Carol and Bob are in the same epistemic position with respect to the cinnamon prop-
osition, (U3) together with traditionalism implies that she is not in a position to know either.
How should the moderate traditionalist respond to this argument? It is not appealing to
say that Bob would do nothing epistemically wrong by asserting the cinnamon propos-
ition in his conversation with Alice. It is one thing to claim that Bob’s high stakes knowl-
edge denials are, contrary to appearances, false. It’s another to say that Bob’s assertion to
Alice that the cupcakes are cinnamon-free would be epistemically impeccable. We may be
mistaken about whether a subject knows without being mistaken about whether a particu-
lar speech act would be proper. If moderate traditionalism indicted our capacity to assess
the propriety of assertions in high stakes situations, it would incur heavier theoretical costs
than just the problem of the misleading appearance of ignorance. The more obvious line of
resistance is to reject (U2). Some traditionalists do argue that knowledge is insufcient for
epistemically proper assertion.16 But is there another way for the moderate traditionalist
to resist the unassertability argument? In the next section I’ll offer a way to endorse each
premise in a form that renders the argument invalid. This path of resistance will lead, in
the following section, to a new solution to the problem of false denials.
5. high stakes unassertability
In doing one thing, you often do others as well. By practicing a piece on the piano you
commit it to memory; by cycling down the path you commute to work; by harrumphing
15 Though see Brown (2010) for criticisms of the use of such conversational practices as evidence for the
sufciency claim.
16 See Brown (2010) and Lackey (2011). Though Stanley (2005) articulates a version of impurism,
Stanley (2008) argues on grounds available to purists that certainty is required for epistemically proper
assertion. On the assumption (which Stanley makes) that being in a position to know does not require
being certain, this position would also provide a basis for rejecting (U2). See also Pynn (forthcoming),
which defends the idea that epistemically proper assertion requires sensitive belief. If sensitive belief
is not required for knowledge, the sensitive belief requirement would also underwrite the rejection
of (U2).
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you express your irritation.17 Moreover, what you do by doing something depends upon
the circumstances in which you do it. In different circumstances, you would practice the
piece without committing it to memory (because of squealing children tumbling through
the living room); cycle down the path without commuting (because you have the day off);
or harrumph without expressing your irritation (because you are acting in a play). The
circumstances in which you act determine, in large part, all of what you thereby do. As
Arthur Danto says, ‘We must read the identity of the action from the context of its exe-
cution’ (Danto 1973: ix).
Assertion is no exception: by asserting you often do other things as well, though what
else you do depends upon your circumstances. You can greet a friend by asserting that
you’re happy to see her, dismiss an objection by asserting that it rests on a claim that’s
been refuted, insult your host by asserting that his cooking is incompetent, or commit her-
esy by asserting that God is not triune.18 In different circumstances the same assertions
may have constituted different doings. In culinary school an assertion that someone’s
cooking is incompetent may constitute constructive criticism, not an insult; had early
church councils had different outcomes, an assertion that God is not triune might have
constituted an expression of Christian orthodoxy, not a commission of heresy; and so on.
With these observations in mind, we can distinguish two conceptions of an epistemi-
cally proper assertion. I’ll say that an assertion is narrowly epistemically proper just in
case it is epistemically proper qua assertion. An assertion’s narrow propriety concerns
the question: ignoring whatever else the speaker would do by asserting that p, is she in
an epistemic position to assert that p? The concept of narrow propriety may be elaborated
with the idea that there is an epistemic rule specic to assertion. On this way of conceiving
of narrow propriety, an assertion is narrowly proper just in case it violates no assertion-
specic epistemic rule. For example, if the Knowledge Rule is the only epistemic rule
specic to assertion, then an assertion is narrowly epistemically proper if and only if it
is known. Weaker rules that specify conditions satised by those who know that p will
also imply that a speaker who knows that p is in a position to make a narrowly epistemi-
cally proper assertion that p.
By contrast an assertion is broadly epistemically proper just in case, by asserting, the
speaker does nothing that she’s not in an epistemic position to do. Our practice of asses-
sing action in terms of epistemic propriety is hardly limited to assertion. You shouldn’t
venture out on to the ice without good evidence that it’s thick enough to hold your weight;
you shouldn’t take a cake out of the oven unless you have good evidence that it’s done.19 If
17 Danto’s related distinction between ‘mediated’ actions – i.e., those one performs by performing other
actions – and `basic’ actions – i.e., those that are not mediated – has received a great deal of attention
(Danto 1973); see Sandis (2010) for a good overview of the literature. In the present discussion, the
notion of a basic action is unimportant: most of the examples I’ll be concerned with involve mediated
actions performed by other mediated actions.
18 What Searle calls ‘indirect speech acts’ are instances of this phenomenon, though I do not wish to say
that everything one does by asserting is thereby a speech act, even an indirect one (Searle 1969).
Greeting, dismissing, insulting, and so on can all be accomplished without speaking, and we needn’t
characterize them as indirect speech acts simply because they can also be accomplished by speaking.
But this is probably a merely terminological quibble. Bertolet (1994) makes a nice case for skepticism
about the existence of indirect speech acts.
19 Fantl and McGrath (2009) credit the ice example to Mark Migotti; the cake example is from
Hawthorne and Stanley (2009).
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by asserting you do something else that you’re not in an epistemic position to do, your
assertion will exhibit an epistemic impropriety not traceable to any epistemic rules specic
to assertion, or the propriety of your assertion qua assertion. An assertion that is broadly
proper will also be narrowly proper, but since one can do something epistemically
improper by asserting without doing anything improper qua asserting, an assertion that
is narrowly proper may not be broadly proper.
The principle that being in a position to know p is sufcient for being in a position to
assert p can thus be understood in two ways. On the narrow construal, the claim is that a
speaker in a position to know p is in a position to make a narrowly epistemically proper
assertion that p. On the broad construal, the claim is that a speaker who knows that p is in
a position to assert that p without doing anything she’s not in an epistemic position to do.
The broad sufciency claim is not plausible. The sufciency principle draws support
from popular views about the constitutive norm of assertion, as well as conversational
practices that indicate that ordinary speakers presuppose that knowing puts them in a pos-
ition to assert. But while these sources support the idea that known assertions are episte-
mically proper qua assertions, they give us no reason to think that any act whatsoever that
one performs by asserting is epistemically proper so long as the speaker knows the content
she asserts. Earlier in this section I mentioned four things one may do by asserting: greet a
friend, dismiss an objection, insult a cook, commit heresy. That is a very small sample.
Given the innite variety of possible conversational circumstances, it seems there is a limit-
less number of things one may do by asserting. It would be surprising to nd that for any
of the many ws one may apparently perform by asserting, it is in fact possible to w by
asserting that p only if knowing that p is sufcient for epistemically proper w-ing.
Three families of cases furnish natural counterexamples to the broad sufciency claim.
First, by asserting that p, one may conversationally implicate information one is not in a
position to communicate. For example, by asserting that there is a gas station around the
corner, a speaker may implicate that gas is available around the corner. If the speaker has
good reason to think that the gas station is long abandoned, she will have done something
epistemically improper by asserting that there is a gas station around the corner, even if
she knows that there is a gas station around the corner. Of course the speaker could cancel
her implicature, and so assert without doing anything epistemically improper; the point is
that if she allows the implicature to stand, by asserting she will have done something epis-
temically improper despite knowing the content she asserts.
Second, by asserting that p one may express an attitude towards p one ought not, epis-
temically, to express. For example, in some conversations an unusually demanding epi-
stemic standard may become salient. In such a conversation a at-out assertion that
p is liable also to constitute an expression of an especially high degree of certainty that
p. If the speaker knows that p but is not in an epistemic position that warrants especially
high certainty that p, she will do something epistemically improper by asserting that p.20
Third, assertions may take on unusual signicance by the adoption of special conven-
tions. For example, suppose that you and your friend are poker cheats who have a code
for communicating surreptitiously to each other during the course of play. One element of
the code is this: whenever one of you wants the other one to fold, you’re to make an
20 This type of case may include assertions that constitute high-strength assertoric acts such as guaran-
teeing or swearing; guaranteeing is discussed in detail in the next section.
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observation about the temperature in the room. Of course your success as cheaters
requires that you’ll instruct your partner to fold only if you have good reason for doing
so. During the course of the game, you notice that it’s getting very warm in the room.
If you’re not in an epistemic position to instruct your partner to fold – you’ve been neg-
ligent in observing the other players’ hands – you’d do something epistemically improper
by asserting that it’s warm in the room, despite knowing that it’s warm in the room.
In each type of case, there is some p such that the speaker knows that p but would do
something broadly epistemically improper by asserting that p. They illustrate that being in
a position to know that p does not ensure that one’s epistemic position with respect to p is
strong enough to make a broadly epistemically proper assertion. But they provide no evi-
dence against the narrow sufciency claim. In each case, the epistemic impropriety of the
assertion derives from the epistemic impropriety of something else the speaker would do
by asserting. So provided the sufciency principle is understood as a claim about narrow
propriety, its plausibility is not undermined by such cases:
(U2N) If a speaker is in a position to know that p, then she is in a position to make a
narrowly epistemically proper assertion that p.
(U2N) implies that a known assertion is narrowly epistemically proper, but not that it is
proper tout court. (U1) implies that Bob would do something epistemically improper by
asserting that the cupcakes are cinnamon-free in his conversation with Alice. But unless
his assertion would be narrowly improper, (U2N) will not license the conclusion that
he is not in a position to know that the cupcakes are cinnamon free. If we have a way
to diagnose the impropriety of Bob’s assertion in terms of what else he would do by assert-
ing, we have a way to disarm the unassertability argument. Is such a diagnosis available?
6. guaranteeing and other epistemically demanding
conversational acts
John Turri argues that in high stakes contexts, speakers who make assertoric utterances
thereby guarantee (Turri 2010). To properly guarantee that p, you need to be in a stronger
epistemic position with respect to p than you do to properly assert that p; on Turri’s
favored view, proper guaranteeing requires knowing that you know. Suppose that Bob’s
assertion would constitute a guarantee that the cupcakes are cinnamon-free. If he doesn’t
know that he knows this, then by asserting he would do something epistemically
improper, even if he knows and hence is in a position to make a narrowly proper asser-
tion. I’m not convinced that Turri’s `knowing-that-you-know’ account of proper guaran-
teeing is satisfactory, so I won’t rely on it further.21 The key idea is that to properly
guarantee that p requires a stronger epistemic position with respect to p than does
21 Here is one obstacle that the KK account of guaranteeing presents when put to work in an explanation
for the impropriety of Bob’s high-stakes assertion. Bob and Carol are ex hypothesi in the same epi-
stemic position with respect to the cinnamon proposition. Thus it is plausible that Carol is in a position
to know that she knows it only if Bob is in a position to know that he knows it. But Carol is in a pos-
ition to assert (1). Given the Knowledge Rule of Assertion – i.e., the rule that one must assert only what
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properly asserting that p; in particular, that it requires more than being in a position to
know that p, and something that Bob lacks.22
Turri’s proposal gives us a way to treat Bob’s assertion as merely broadly improper:
though he knows that p, in his conversation with Alice his assertion would constitute a
guarantee, which he is not in an epistemic position to make. If so, we have a rationale
for treating (U1) as a claim about broad propriety:
(U1B) In his conversation with Alice, Bob is not in an epistemic position to make a broad-
ly proper assertion that the cupcakes are cinnamon-free.
Since broad impropriety does not imply narrow impropriety, (U1B) and (U2N) do not
together imply (U3). This treatment of the premises gives us a way to disarm the unassert-
ability argument without rejecting the sufciency principle.
One might object that if Bob’s assertion would be improper only in virtue of constitut-
ing a guarantee, he should be able to assert properly by disavowing an intention to guar-
antee: by saying, for example, ‘The cupcakes don’t have any cinnamon, though I don’t
guarantee it.’ But such a clarication would not make the assertion epistemically proper.
Since the assertion’s epistemic impropriety would survive an explicit disavowal of the
speaker’s intention to guarantee, it must attach to the assertion qua assertion; i.e., it
must be narrow impropriety.
However, the objection makes two questionable assumptions. The rst is that to assert
while disavowing an intention to guarantee is sufcient to assert without guaranteeing.
When circumstances are such that by asserting one would also w, intending not to w is
not generally sufcient for asserting without w-ing. Indeed, whether an assertion constitu-
tes a w-ing can lie quite outside the speaker’s control. The assertions of a witness who has
taken an oath to tell the truth constitute sworn testimony whether or not she intends them
to. She cannot refrain from offering sworn testimony by mentally crossing her ngers.
Perhaps guaranteeing is like this: in high stakes conversations one may be unable to
one knows – she is in a position to know that she knows the cinnamon proposition. So one of the fol-
lowing is false: (1) you should assert only what you’re in a position to know, (2) when S and S* are in
the same epistemic position with respect to p, either both are in a position to know that she herself
knows, or neither is, or (3) proper guaranteeing requires being in a position to know that you
know. Since Turri presents his account as one on which high stakes unassertability is compatible
with the Knowledge Rule, rejecting (1) is unappealing. I won’t pretend that (2) is clearly true, but
defending the KK story here would require an argument that Bob and Carol, though in the same epi-
stemic position with respect to the cinnamon proposition, are in different epistemic positions with
respect to the higher-order proposition. Turri himself says that knowing that you know constitutes
a ‘greater epistemic achievement than merely knowing’ (2010: p. 87, fn. 15); it is not obvious how
two subjects could be in the same epistemic position with respect to p yet one be creditable with a
greater epistemic achievement with respect to p than the other.
22 More precisely, Turri’s view is that in high stakes circumstances by making an assertoric utterance one
makes a guarantee rather than an assertion (Turri 2010: 88–9, esp. footnote 18). On this picture Bob
would not guarantee by asserting, because he would not assert; he would rather guarantee by making
an assertoric utterance. But this element of Turri’s proposal is inessential: one could also hold that in
high stakes circumstances a speaker guarantees by asserting, or that guaranteeing is a special kind of
asserting. This would echo Williamson’s suggestion that swearing – a speech act with ‘a more stringent
evidential norm’ than that governing assertion – may simply be a ‘solemn way of asserting’
(Williamson 2000: 244–5).
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prevent one’s assertoric utterance from constituting a guarantee, even if one intends it as a
(mere) assertion. If intending to assert without guaranteeing is insufcient to prevent Bob’s
assertion from constituting a guarantee, then disavowing an intention to guarantee won’t
restore his assertion to epistemic propriety.
The second assumption that the objection makes is that the impropriety of the utter-
ance would be epistemic in nature. This may be doubted. When a guarantee is needed
or expected, a mere assertion is liable to be pointless or misleading. Thus someone who
asserts while explicitly disavowing the intention to guarantee in such a circumstance is
apt to express a stubbornly uncooperative attitude, or else to signal confusion about
the conversational demands. If, in Bob’s conversation, a guarantee is needed or expected,
an assertion of ‘The cupcakes don’t have any cinnamon, though I don’t guarantee it’
would be pragmatically defective. This defect would enable us to explain the assertion’s
impropriety without reference to any epistemic impropriety. If the impropriety of the con-
junction can be explained in these more broadly pragmatic terms, it does not provide evi-
dence that Bob’s assertion that the cupcakes don’t have any cinnamon is narrowly
improper.
Turri’s suggestion about guaranteeing is not the only way to diagnose the impropriety
of Bob’s assertion as being merely broad. There are other candidates for the epistemically
improper action Bob’s assertion would constitute in his conversation with Alice. For
example, by asserting he may also:
• Express an attitude of certainty towards the cinnamon proposition.
• Promise Alice that Ted won’t have an adverse reaction to the cupcakes.
• Convince or persuade Alice to give Ted a cupcake.23
Recognizing that there is a tiny but conversationally relevant chance that the cupcakes
have cinnamon in them, Bob is not in a position to express certainty. Similarly, he’s not
in a position to promise Alice that Ted won’t have an adverse reaction to eating them.
And given the risks, his epistemic position doesn’t justify him in convincing Alice to
give Ted a cupcake. Independently of Turri’s proposal about guaranteeing, then, the mod-
erate traditionalist who wishes to respect the sufciency principle has numerous paths to
resist the argument from unassertability to ignorance.
7. unassertability and the appearance of ignorance
Now we return to the appearance of ignorance. The distinction between narrow and
broad propriety opens up a new explanation for the appearance of ignorance in cases
like Bob’s. According to the unassertability solution, Bob recognizes that his epistemic
position with respect to the cinnamon proposition is insufcient for properly asserting
it. He also has the sufciency principle among his background presuppositions. His
23 Unlike asserting, expressing, and promising, convincing and persuading are examples of what Austin
calls perlocutionary acts (Austin 1962: 101). Perlocutionary acts essentially involve the production of
certain effects in listeners. The broad propriety of a given assertion may turn on the propriety of caus-
ing its perlocutionary effects; if by asserting something I persuade you to shoot someone, my assertion
may be broadly improper because I ought not to bring about the shooting, even if it is entirely proper
qua assertion. The suggestion here is that the epistemic impropriety of a perlocutionary act can under-
mine the broad epistemic propriety of the assertion used to accomplish it.
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recognition of the epistemic impropriety of the assertion, together with his acceptance of
the sufciency principle, generates the impression of ignorance. If the impropriety would
be merely broad, the appearance may be inaccurate. When a subject’s epistemic position
with respect to p is sufcient for narrow but not broad assertability, speakers are apt to
experience a misleading impression of ignorance.
Not every broadly improper but narrowly proper assertion will appear unknown, even
to speakers who are sensitive to its impropriety and presuppose the sufciency principle. If
an assertion that p would be broadly improper because it would generate an unwarranted
implicature that q, we should not expect the speaker to judge that she doesn’t know that
p. The key factor in Bob’s case is that the broad impropriety of asserting p results from a
weakness in his epistemic position with respect to p. The unassertability solution says that
when a weakness in the speaker’s epistemic position with respect to p would make her
assertion that p improper and she presupposes that being in a position to know is suf-
cient for being in a position to assert, she will tend to judge that she is not in a position
to know that p. When, in fact, she is in a position to know that p – and hence her assertion
would be merely broadly improper – this judgment will be inaccurate.
The solution credits Bob with awareness that:
(*) Due to a weakness in my epistemic position with respect to p, I should not assert that p.
As we have seen (*) can be made true in two different ways:
(*N) Due to a weakness in my epistemic position with respect to p, asserting that p would
be narrowly epistemically improper.
(*B) Due to a weakness in my epistemic position with respect to p, asserting that p would
be (merely) broadly epistemically improper.
In Bob’s conversation, (*) is true in virtue of (*B), and not in virtue of (*N). The capacity
to differentiate cases where (*B) is true from cases where (*N) is true presupposes a grasp
of a philosophically sophisticated distinction that we can hardly expect ordinary speakers
to draw, especially in the hurly-burly of ordinary conversation. Moreover, the distinction
is of little practical signicance. Whether (*) is true because of (*B) or (*N), the action-
guiding upshot is the same: the speaker ought not to assert p without rst improving
her epistemic position with respect to p. For ordinary speakers to avoid epistemically
improper assertions, sensitivity to impropriety tout court is enough.
Not only is there no practical signicance in distinguishing between cases where (*N) is
true and cases where (*B) is true, the distinction will remain elusive even to speakers who
are sophisticated enough to draw it. When asserting that p would be broadly improper,
asserting that p is known would be even more emphatically improper. So in circumstances
where a speaker cannot assert that p because (for example) she is not in an epistemic
position to guarantee that p, she will also be unable to assert that she knows or is in a
position to know p. Given the sufciency principle, this means that when a speaker is
in a position to make a narrowly proper (because known) assertion, but not a broadly
proper one (due to a weakness in her epistemic position with respect to p), she will be
in no position to assert that this is the case. For such a speaker to provide an accurate
description of her position vis-à-vis p’s assertability would require making an assertion
that is, in the circumstances, forbidden on epistemic grounds.
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Even though the distinction between (*B) and (*N) is elusive and practically insigni-
cant, blindness to it will, together with the sufciency principle, tend to produce mislead-
ing impressions of ignorance. Bob recognizes that his epistemic position with respect to the
cinnamon proposition makes it improper to assert that proposition in his conversation
with Alice, and accepts that being in a position to know is sufcient for being in a position
to assert. Insensitivity to the distinction between (*B) and (*N) thus leads to the impres-
sion that the cinnamon proposition is unknown.24
8. the unassertability solution and the desiderata
The unassertability solution predicts that a high stakes speaker who recognizes that she is
not in a position to assert that p will tend to judge that she is not in a position to know
that p: the appearance of ignorance is grounded in a recognition that her epistemic pos-
ition is insufcient for assertability, which leads, via the sufciency principle, to the judg-
ment that she is not in a position to know (Position to Know). We should expect that
subjects who make such a judgment will regard the literal contents of their knowledge
denials as true (Semantics), and that these contents will appear true even in thought
(Thought). Since the judgment stems from an accurate appraisal of the speaker’s own epi-
stemic position – in particular, that her position is insufcient for proper assertion – it is
one we should expect epistemically responsible speakers to make (Responsibility), and to
involve no overestimation of her epistemic risks (Accuracy).
Finally, the solution predicts that subjects in the same epistemic position as the speaker
will also appear not to be in a position to know (Projection). A high stakes subject who
succumbs to the error posited by the unassertability solution thinks that her epistemic pos-
ition is insufcient for knowing. Whatever weakness in her own epistemic position pre-
sents an apparent block to knowing will also appear to prevent another subject in the
same epistemic position from knowing. So we should expect her to treat any subject
whose epistemic position she takes to be equivalent to her own as also not being in a pos-
ition to know. The unassertability solution thus predicts that rst-person and third-person
judgments about knowledge and ignorance will sway together.
9. the solitary appearance of ignorance
Like most widely known cases mustered as evidence against traditionalism, those of Carol
and Bob center on conversations, and so provide the raw materials for the unassertability
24 Though my focus is on the misleading appearance of ignorance in high stakes situations, the unassert-
ability solution can be extended to cases where stakes are not a factor. For example, fallibilists allow
that a subject can know that p without having decisive evidence against various far-fetched skeptical
hypotheses. In some conversational settings, though, an assertion that p may constitute a wholesale
dismissal of such far-fetched hypotheses. If one’s epistemic position with respect to p is insufcient
to warrant such a dismissal, assertion is liable to be epistemically improper. Correctly sensing that
asserting p would be epistemically improper, the speaker and her interlocutors, blind to the fact
that her assertion would be merely broadly improper but aware of the sufciency of knowledge for
epistemically proper assertion, would experience the misleading appearance that she is not in a pos-
ition to know that p.
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solution to work with. But what about situations where assertion is not an issue?25
Suppose that Bob doesn’t learn of Ted’s cinnamon allergy from Alice, but discovers in soli-
tude that he himself has the dangerous condition. If, considering his own epistemic situ-
ation, he judges that he is not in a position to know the cinnamon proposition, then he
has made an error by the moderate traditionalist’s lights. And yet he is not contemplating
an assertion of that proposition. A high stakes error that is not rooted in a judgment about
the epistemic propriety of an assertion isn’t explained by the unassertability solution.
What should we say about such cases?
First, it is not altogether clear that a subject privately contemplating the question of p is
not considering an assertion that p. Solitary deliberation about p is most readily imagined
as an internal dialogue concerning p. It is natural to think that an internal dialogue that
issues in a judgment that p ends in a private assertion that p. So even subjects merely won-
dering whether p may be contemplating an assertion that p; i.e., an assertion of p to them-
selves. If judgment is a species of assertion, then we could apply the unassertability
account to cases not involving conversation. However, even granting the thesis that soli-
tary judgment is a species of assertion, the unassertability account could only handle such
cases if a judgment that p would also constitute an act that the subject’s epistemic position
with respect to p does not warrant.
Still, the unassertability solution illuminates a path for explaining the solitary appear-
ance of ignorance. The solution implements a more general strategy. The general strategy
starts by identifying a principle on which being in a position to know that p is sufcient
for epistemically proper w-ing. In a case where there is no practical difference between
w-ing and ψ-ing, but to ψ would be improper due to a weakness in one’s epistemic position
with respect to p, acceptance of the principle can generate the misleading appearance of
ignorance. A subject who is sensitive to the fact that w-ing would be epistemically
improper due to a weakness in her epistemic position and fails to distinguish between
w-ing and ψ-ing can be led by the principle to judge that she isn’t in a position to know p.
The unassertability account results when w-ing is asserting that p and ψ-ing is some other con-
versational act that would be performed by an assertion that p. But the strategy can be imple-
mented in other ways. Here is one possibility:
Prescinding from the characterization of judgment as a private form of assertion, it is
plausible that being in a position to know that p is sufcient for epistemically proper judg-
ing that p: if you’re in a position to know that p, you’re in a position to judge that p. In
some circumstances, though, there may be no practical difference between a judgment that
p and a distinct cognitive act one is not in a position to perform. And in particular, an
epistemically proper judgment that p may not be practically distinct from a cognitive
act one’s epistemic position with respect to p does not warrant. For example, when I
am knowingly presented with a choice that will result in my death if p is false, there
may be no practical difference between judging that p and resolving to risk my life on
my being correct about p. But I can know that p without its being epistemically proper
for me to risk my life on the question of whether p.26 Moreover, when I am not in an epi-
stemic position to risk my life on p, that’s partly because of a weakness in my epistemic
25 This excellent question was posed by an anonymous referee.
26 This idea is widely accepted among moderates; e.g., Fantl and McGrath defend their conception of
fallibilism partly by appeal to cases where one knows that p but it would not be rational to stake
one’s life on p (Fantl and McGrath 2009: 13).
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position with respect to p: properly staking one’s life on p requires being in a stronger epi-
stemic position with respect to p than most of us are with respect to many propositions we
are in a position to know. A subject who recognizes that by judging that p she would stake
her life on p, and that her epistemic position with respect to p makes such a risk epistemi-
cally improper, will, if she treats being in a position to know as sufcient for epistemically
proper judging, be susceptible to the misleading appearance of ignorance in a way closely
analogous to that described by the unassertability account. It is not difcult to t the soli-
tary version of Bob’s high-stakes impression of ignorance into this suggestion.
10. conclusion
In sections 5 and 6, I argued that the distinction between narrow and broad propriety neu-
tralizes the threat that the sufciency principle poses to moderate traditionalism. Then in
sections 7 and 8, I used that distinction to develop an explanation for the apparent loss of
knowledge in high stakes situations. Since we don’t ordinarily draw the distinction
between narrow and broad propriety, our acceptance of the sufciency principle leads,
in high stakes situations, to the misleading appearance of ignorance.
Important questions remain to be addressed on behalf of the unassertability solution.
One is to give an explanation of the conversational dynamics that result in a high stakes
speaker’s assertion constituting an act she is not in a position to perform. Turri’s proposal
about guaranteeing is not unproblematic, and we didn’t explore in depth the other sugges-
tions made at the end of that section, nor that made in section 9 to account for the solitary
appearance of ignorance. Another is to offer an explanation for how a weakness in your
epistemic position with respect to p could make it epistemically improper to act even
though you are in a position to know that p. This claim stands in prima facie tension
with the popular principle that knowing that p allows you to treat p as a reason for act-
ing.27 But moderate traditionalists need to address this tension anyway: when the stakes
get high enough, even subjects in very strong epistemic positions with respect to p seem
blocked from treating p as true for the sake of deliberation. The unassertability solution’s
ability to predict and explain all of the features of the most problematic examples of the
high stakes appearance of ignorance gives moderate traditionalists an additional motiv-
ation for clarifying the relationship between knowledge and epistemically permissible
action.28
27 Ichikawa (2012) calls this the knowledge norm of practical reasoning, and draws an important distinc-
tion between its being appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting and p’s rationalizing an action. In
terms of Ichikawa’s distinction, the question is: what accounts for cases where your epistemic position
with respect to p puts you in a position to treat p as a reason for acting, but is too weak for p to ration-
alize your action? For related principles, see Hawthorne and Stanley’s (2009) ‘Reasons-Knowledge
Principle’ and Fantl and McGrath’s (2009) principle KJ.
28 Thanks to Troy Cross and Mylan Engel for feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, and an anonymous
referee for very fruitful comments.
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